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The paper considers the optimal regulation of access charges, and the
effect such regulation has on incentives to foreclose downstream rival firms.
I show that when a vertically integrated firm is able to discriminate against
rivals by means of non-price measures, optimal access charges must be set
higher than in the case when no discrimination is possible and will always
provide a positive access margin. The reason is that the level of the access
charge affects incentives to practice foreclosure. The optimal access charge
may, when non-price measures are not possible, be lower than marginal cost
of providing access.
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1 Introduction
In vertically related markets, the production of final products makes use of (essen-
tial) inputs produced in complementary markets. The producers of these essential
inputs usually have opportunities to earn positive economic profits. The extent to
which this is possible depends, among other things, both on regulatory and compe-
tition policies. In the communications industry, firms offering e.g. Internet access to
end-users must purchase access to consumers from local access providers, and the
pricing of local access is often subject to regulation.1 The main reason for regulating
access charges is to stimulate competition, by ensuring that rival firms can obtain
access to end-users at reasonable terms. This means setting a low access charge.
Allowing vertical integration opens up the possibility for foreclosure activities by
the vertically integrated firm, by restricting the integrated firm’s earning potential
upstream results in an increased incentive to foreclose its rivals (as is pointed out by,
e.g., Sibley and Weisman, 1998). A combined policy of allowing vertical integration
and regulation of the monopoly rent upstream (through access charge regulation)
may have an adverse effect on downstream competition. By restricting local access
providers’ opportunity to serve long-distance markets (i.e., refusing vertical integra-
tion), competition authorities may restrict the potential for earning monopoly rent
upstream without resorting to the regulation of access charges.2 This is a result well
known in the literature on vertical relations.3
The contribution of the present paper to the theory of access charge regulation
is to provide an analysis of how the opportunity for foreclosure of independent
rivals affects the socially optimal access charges. The foreclosure may be thought
of either as degrading the quality of network inputs, or equivalently, as increasing
the cost of purchasing such inputs (in addition to the exogenously given access
1The local access providers are often the incumbent telecommunications companies.
2In the case of U.S. legislation, restrictions are to some extent imposed on which firms are
allowed into the long-distance markets. However, in the present paper vertical separation is not
considered.
3This result is a consequence of the upstream firm’s inability to credibly commit to charging
monopoly prices (Rey and Tirole, 1997)
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price). The increased costs for the rivals could, for instance, be due to legal expenses
incurred when attempting to obtain access on equal terms with the network owner’s
downstream subsidiary, or more direct costs due to lower quality of access.
The access terms offered to rival firms consist of two main elements - the price
paid for access and the quality of access. I assume that the access charge is subject to
regulation. The issue of access charge regulation has been examined by a number of
other authors (e.g., Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996), Laffont and Tirole (1990,
1996)). In contrast to their work, I focus on the relation between the regulated access
charge and the vertically integrated firm’s incentive to foreclose its rival along other
dimensions. The network provider has ample opportunities to degrade the quality of
access offered to its competitors. The decision of the network provider (the vertically
integrated firm) on access quality is not regulated in the model, and may affect
competition in the downstream market. The incentive to foreclose rival firms in a
complementary market segment is considered by, e.g., Economides (1998a,b), Sibley
and Weisman (1998), Mandy (2000), Weisman and Kang (2001), Reiffen and Ward
(2002), and Beard, Kaserman and Mayo (2001). These authors have all identified
the level of the access charge as a determinant for non-price foreclosure. Contrary to
their work, the present paper considers an endogenous access charge and investigates
how access charges should be set in this context to achieve the social optimum. The
issue of raising rivals’ costs is the focus of Economides (1998a, 1998b), and his model
is extended to incorporate the optimal regulation of access charges.
The issue analysed in the present paper is also related to optimal price regulation
when firms provide unverifiable quality, which is dealt with by, e.g., Laffont and
Tirole (1991) and Lewis and Sappington (1991). By allowing firms to charge a
price in excess of marginal cost, overall efficiency is reduced through a contraction
in output. However, a high profit margin results in improved incentives to provide
quality, and the efficiency loss from such a pricing policy is balanced by higher
quality. In the present paper, the efficiency loss due to pricing access in excess of
marginal cost is balanced against the reduction in the efficiency loss from foreclosure.
In the present model, following a partial approach, I assume that the downstream
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industry is deregulated.4 This is the case, e.g., in the telecommunications industry.
Often, the regulation of access charges is easier to implement than regulation of
final product prices due to a vast array of different products on the market. It
also seems to be the case that industry regulators focus more of their attention
on the regulation of access terms. I also assume that the regulator’s toolbox is
restricted. Specifically, the regulator is assumed to be able to set a linear access
charge and a transfer payment to ensure incentive compatibility and participation
by the regulated firm. The regulator cannot, however, devise a penalty scheme to
avoid non-price discrimination.5 This is consistent with regulatory practice in, for
instance, the communications industry where regulators often are restricted to only
instruct the regulated firm to cease such activities (without the use of penalties).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 the basic model is
presented and analysed, in section 3 I investigate the optimal regulation of access
charges both when the vertically integrated firm can and cannot use non-price dis-
crimination. In section 4 make some concluding remarks.
2 A model of vertically related markets
There are two firms. Firm  is a vertically integrated firm (VIF), that supplies an
essential input for the production of the final product and competes in the final
product market. Firm  is an (independent) producer of a final product. The pro-
duction technology is of a fixed-coefficient type, with each unit of output requiring
one unit of input. When determining the access charge, the regulator must take into
account that the regulated firm may take some unverifiable actions which affect the
4Throughout the paper I assume that the regulator cannot regulate the downstream sector
due to reasons external to the model presented below. This is also the starting point of Vickers
(1995). A general model of optimal regulation should be able to explain the deregulation of the
downstream industry following as the optimal outcome of a complete regulatory setup.
5The regulator can, in the absence of uncertainty, device a penalty scheme that makes non-
price discrimination prohibitively costly. Specifically, when outputs and prices are different from
the no foreclosure case, the regulator penalises the regulated firm sufficiently hard to deter such
behaviour.
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costs of its downstream rival. It is assumed that the regulator has only imperfect
knowledge about the cost of producing the essential input, and therefore utilises
incentive contracts to induce truthful revelation.6
The demand side
In the downstream market firms are facing the inverse linear demand function,
 () = −, where  =  +  is total production downstream. Net consumers’






The VIF earns profit in two different markets - the upstream and downstream
market. This implies that foreclosing rival firms downstream entails an opportunity
cost - the reduction in profits in the upstream activity resulting from a lower overall
production level downstream. In addition, foreclosure entails a monetary cost. Ac-
tivities designed to foreclose rival firms are normally not consistent with competition
laws. Consequently, firms that undertake such activities must conceal their actions,
and it is realistic to assume that this is costly. Foreclosure is socially wasteful both
since total downstream production is reduced and since it involves a monetary cost
of the unproductive activity.7
The profit function of the independent downstream firm  is given by:
Π =
¡
 ()− 	 − 
 − ¢  (2)
where 
 is the efficiency level, and  is the production level of firm . Let 	 denote
the degree of foreclosure in the access terms for the competitors (unverifiable by the
6There is a continuing debate in the industry about the desirability of cost-based access charges.
The main reason for assuming imperfect knowledge about the upstream cost only, and not other
aspects of the problem, is to focus on the extent to which access charges should be distorted away
from marginal costs when these costs are not known by the regulator.
7An alternative justification for  () could be that a more pronounced level of foreclosure
makes it more likely that the competition authorities reveals the unwanted practice, which may
lead to a fine being imposed on the firm practicing foreclosure. An extension to the model could
incorporate a monetary penalty if foreclosure is detected as an additional regulatory instrument.
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regulator). A high level of 	 is interpreted as a low level of access quality offered to
the rival firm, which reduces the willingness to pay for the product sold to end-users.
The regulated variable  is the price all downstream firms pay per unit of the inputs
purchased from the upstream firm.8




 − ¢  + ( − 
)−  (	) + −  (3)
where 
 and 
 are the downstream and upstream efficiency levels,  is the down-
stream production of the VIF,  is the total production downstream,  is the transfer
from the regulator, and  is a fixed cost related to upstream production. There are
no capacity constraints upstream, and upstream inputs are available to any firm
willing to pay the prevailing price.9 The cost of foreclosure,  (	), is increasing and
strictly convex (  0,   0), and is assumed to have the following quadratic
form:  (	) = 	22. In the case where the integrated firm cannot foreclose its rival,
the parameter 	 is normalised to zero, with  (0) = 0.
Welfare and the regulator
The regulator is assumed to maximise a utilitarian welfare function, where trans-
fers awarded to the regulated firm are socially costly due to distortions imposed on
other sectors of the economy to raise the revenue. The welfare function is given by:
 =  +Π +Π − (1 + )  (4)
8All downstream firms obtain access at the same price, including the downstream subsidiary
of the upstream firm. For the vertically integrated firm the access charge is, however, simply an
internal transfer.
9With no capacity constraints upstream, one may argue that price competition is more likely
than quantity competition. However, one ad hoc justification of the use of quantity competition,
may be that each downstream firm must decide on a capacity level prior to entering into the
downstream market (e.g., firms must lease lines from the local access provider and these lines are
of a fixed capacity). This would imply that each firm has limited capacity in the last stage of the
game. In such a situation, and under certain conditions about the capacity levels and the rationing
rule, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show that the unique outcome of a price competition game
with capacity constraints is the Cournot outcome.
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where (1 + ) is the social cost of transfers to the regulated firm, with   0. The
welfare function is assumed to be concave in .10 The basic model is extended
to allow for informational asymmetry to examine how imperfect knowledge of the
network production costs may affect the determination of access charges. The reg-
ulatory agency is assumed to have only imperfect knowledge of the costs upstream.
The distribution,  (
) with the strictly positive density function  (
)  0, and




 ≥ 0 are assumed to be common
knowledge. The upstream and downstream costs of the VIF are assumed to be
independently distributed, which implies that observation of the downstream costs
yields no information about upstream efficiency to the regulator.
Timing of the game
The stages of the game are as follows: At Stage 1, the regulator offers a contract





´o to the regulated firm. At Stage 2 , the regulated
firm reports a type b
 to the regulator, and the contract is executed. The regulator
assigns the firm a transfer, , and an access charge, . At Stage 3 , the regulated firm
decides on the quality of access terms to downstream rivals (the level of foreclosure),
	. At Stage 4 , firms compete á la Cournot in the downstream market.
2.1 Solving the model
Define ∗ and ∗ as the Cournot equilibrium quantities for the vertically integrated
firm and the rival, and let ∗ = ∗+ ∗ be the total output downstream in equilib-
rium (see appendix 1 for details). Using the equilibrium quantities, we can express
the stage 4 equilibrium profit for firm  as:
Π∗ = (∗)2 + ( − 
) ∗ − 
2
	2 + −  (5)






10Sufficient conditions to ensure concavity of the welfare function with respect to the access
charge are:  ≥ 0 and   23. The latter assumption also ensures that the single-crossing
condition is of constant sign.
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Foreclosure benefits the regulated firm through two effects: First, foreclosing
the downstream rival reduces its equilibrium output and increases the vertically
integrated firm’s equilibrium output since quantities are strategic substitutes. Sec-
ondly, foreclosure increases the price on the inframarginal units of firm ’s output
downstream. These benefits are traded off against the opportunity cost of foreclo-
sure, which is due to the contractive effect on upstream profit resulting from lower
quantity sold to its rivals and the monetary cost of foreclosure.
When the VIF can foreclose rival firms by degrading the quality of inputs sold
to its rivals, 	 is chosen to maximise Π, subject to  = ∗ and  = ∗. The profit
maximising level of quality degradation 	∗, is governed by the following relationship:
[( − 
) + ∗] 
∗
	
−  = 0 (7)
The VIF essentially provides two products; access and the final product. When
the rival firm produces the final product more efficiently, it may better for the
VIF to concentrate on the provision of access and leave as much as possible of the
production of the final product to the rival. These effects can be identified through
a closer examination of VIF’s foreclosure incentives.
Observing eqn. (7) we note that if [( − 
) + ∗]  0, or equivalently if net
marginal profit of an increase in the rival’s quantity is positive, then firm  chooses
minimum foreclosure; 	∗ = 0. In line with the reasoning of Economides (1998b),
we observe that [( − 
) + ∗]  0 can only be positive and consistent with
the existence of profit-maximising downstream rivals if the downstream subsidiary
of the VIF is sufficiently inefficient.11
Lemma 1 If 
   −   
 + 	, then [( − 
) + ∗]  0.
This implies that the VIF may wish to shift downstream market shares in favour
11Assume [( − ) + 	
∗]  0. The first-order condition for the profit-maximising quantity
choice for the vertically integrated firm is given by: (*) [	
∗ + ( − )] + 	 −  −  = 0.
Then, the condition [	
∗ + ( − )]  0 implies 	 −  . The first-order condition for the
rival firm is given by: (**) 	
∗+	 −−−  = 0. We observe that if  = , condition (**)
cannot be satisfied if  ≥ 0. However, condition (**) can be satisfied if   	 −    + ; i.e.,
if  is sufficiently greater than .
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of its own rival if its own downstream subsidiary is sufficiently inefficient, and the
VIF effectively outsources (part of) the production of the final product to its rival.








 − 2 + 
¢ (8)
The profit maximising level of foreclosure has the following properties (see ap-
pendix 1 for details): The degree of foreclosure is reduced when the downstream
inefficiency of the vertically integrated firm increases; 	∗
  0. The intuition
is that higher downstream costs makes it relatively more profitable to offer access
downstream (which corresponds to a lower 	), rather than to compete in services
downstream. A low level of foreclosure will induce the rival to produce a larger part
of total output. Furthermore, the degree of foreclosure is increasing in upstream
marginal cost. Higher upstream costs makes it less profitable to offer access, and
the VIF chooses to compete downstream (corresponds to a higher 	) rather than
to offer access. The fact that 	∗  0 is a result of 	 and  being substitute
foreclosure activities.13 A firm selling essential inputs to independent downstream
firms, can improve its own downstream subsidiary’s position by either increasing the
access charge or by reducing the quality of access.14
3 Optimal regulation
The focus in the present paper is on regulation of access charges when non-price
foreclosure is an option for the regulated firm, and the majority of the analysis
12The second-order condition for ∗ to be a maximum is   29, which is assumed to be
satisfied throughout the paper. If, on the other hand, the second-order condition is not satisfied,
the vertically integrated firm will choose a level of  which completely forecloses its rival. Such a
convexity arises in, e.g., Mandy (2000).
13The latter property has been noted by, e.g., Sibley and Weisman (1998).
14This can also be related to the multi-task literature (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). If the
regulated firm is not given enough margin along the regulated dimension,  − , this may have
a negative effect on the unregulated (unobservable) dimension, . A small margin in the regulated
dimension effectively means that the regulated firm is given strong incentives to foreclose.
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will focus on the full information case as this case captures many of the interesting
implications for regulation of the incentives to foreclose rival firms. The absence
of non-price discrimination can be taken to mean that regulators are able to write
complete contracts related to the access terms offered to other firms.15 This can be
considered as a benchmark case to investigate the effects of foreclosure on the level of
optimal access charges. I will investigate both the unregulated scenario and the case
of full information before I procede with the derivation of the socially optimal access
charge when the VIF is privately informed about the cost of providing access.16
3.1 Unregulated access charge
In an unregulated environment, the VIF can choose to foreclose rival firms using
either the access price or through non-price discrimination. Since non-price discrim-
ination is costly for the integrated firm, a preferable (i.e., less costly) method of
foreclosure is to set a high access charge. Using the access charge to disadvantage
the rival firm has the same qualitative effect as non-price foreclosure, but gener-
ates access revenue to the VIF.17 The unregulated firm maximises profit, Π =
(∗)2 + ( − 
) ∗ −  with respect to , subject to ∗ ≥ 0 and ∗ ≥ 0.










 = , we have  = (− + 
) 2. This implies that ∗ = 0; the
VIF will be a monopolist in both markets, since there are no cost efficiency gains
from outsourcing production. If firms are not symmetric, the rival firm will be active
in the downstream market provided that it is more efficient than the downstream
subsidiary of the VIF.
15Alternatively, this case can be interpreted as a situation where the regulator can utilise a wider
variety of regulatory instruments (such as monetary penalties).
16Although the full information solution is considered as a benchmark case, it is not the first-best
solution since the downstream market is unregulated and the number of firms is assumed to be
exogenously given.
17This is noted by, e.g., Beard, Kaserman and Mayo (2001).
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3.2 Full information






2 + (1 + )
h
()2 + ( − 








¢2 − (1 + ) − Π
subject to: i) Π (
) ≥ 0 (the participation constraint), ii) 	∗ = argmax

Π (∗ ∗)
and iii)  = ∗ ≥ 0,  = ∗ ≥ 0. Since rents to the regulated firm are costly, the
regulator will determine transfers such that Π (
) = 0.
The main trade-off involved in determining the optimal access charge is between
minimising the efficiency loss due to market power in the downstream market and
minimising the efficiency loss of the transfers. It is assumed that the firms competing
downstream possess market power, which implies that there is an inefficiency in this
market. This inefficiency will be further exacerbated if the input price is higher
than the marginal cost of providing access (i.e., the vertical externality problem).
Subsidising the rival’s cost (by subsidising access) is one way to correct for this
inefficiency. However, there is a second distortion since transfers to the regulated
firm must be financed by distortionary taxes. Which of these distortions is the
more pronounced will determine the appropriate policy on access pricing. When
the latter effect is more important, access should not be subsidised. Whether the
optimal access charge is higher or lower than the marginal cost of providing access
will depend on which distortion is the more costly at the margin - the cost of public
funds, or the deadweight-loss downstream.18
3.2.1 Access charge regulation (no foreclosure)
The full information access charge when the VIF cannot use non-price discrimination
is denoted 	, and solves [RP 1] (see appendix 2). The optimal access policy calls
for an access surplus, except for the case where the downstream subsidiary is highly
18The relative efficiency of the downstream firms will also be of importance, as this affects how
the downstream inefficiency can be mitigated by transferring production between firms.
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inefficient. When the downstream subsidiary is highly inefficient it is better to
subsidise the rival to distort market shares to the integrated firm’s disadvantage.
Proposition 1 For symmetric downstream firms and with 
 = 
 = 0, 	  


when   02. For shadow cost of public funds below this level, the optimal access
charge is always less than 
.
It is reasonable that the degree to which there is an access deficit (	  

)
is smaller the higher is the social cost of public funds. When  becomes large,
the cost of transferring a lump-sum payment to the regulated firm imposes a more
significant efficiency loss elsewhere in the economy. In this case, optimal policy on
access charges shifts from subsidising the rival firm and using compensating lump-
sum transfers, to allowing the regulated firm to earn a positive margin on access
provision.19
The access charge should be set to reflect cost asymmetries between the vertically
integrated firm and the independent rival. The optimal access charge is used to
ensure that market shares are distorted in favour of the more efficient firm (in the
end-user production), with the access charge being (unambiguously) decreasing in

 and increasing in 
 (see appendix 2). This implies that a level playing field
as often advocated by regulators is in general not the socially optimal regulatory
regime.20 A similar result is obtained by Lewis and Sappington (1999).
3.2.2 Access charge regulation (foreclosure)
The constrained optimal access charge,  , is the solution to the regulator’s max-
imisation problem [RP 1] (see appendix 2). Now, the optimal access charge will
19In the presence of fixed costs upstream and prohibition against the use of lump-sum transfers,
the optimality of an access subsidy can be questioned. It is then reasonable that the optimal access
charge needs to be distorted in excess of marginal cost for Ramsey-reasons to ensure fixed cost
recovery.
20There is, however, a caveat related to the shadow cost pf public funds. When  becomes
sufficiently large (  54), efficiency in production becomes less important whereas the cost of
transfers is the dominating concern since the regulated firm will transfer funds to the regulator.
The regulator will prefer a high level of profit for the regulated firm which can be taxed away
through the regulatory mechanism.
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depend not only on relative efficiencies and the social cost of public funds, but also
on the convexity of the foreclosure cost function  (	):21
Proposition 2 Assume that 
 = 
 = 0. When the integrated firm can use non-
price discrimination, we find that:
i.   

	 for all permissible parameter values.
ii.   

 for any level of the shadow cost of public funds if e    23.
iii.  ≤ 
 if  is sufficiently low and  ≥  ≥ e.
iv. The optimal access charge is higher when the foreclosure cost is less convex
(i.e., the smaller is ).
Proof. Assume 
 = 
 = 0. Part i): Straightforward but tedious algebraic
manipulations, and hence omitted. Part ii) and iii): Define  ≡  − 
. Then,
  0 iff (∗) (38− 9)+  (4 + (45− 28))− 16  0. A sufficient condition for
the second-order condition with respect to  to be satisfied is   23, in which
case (∗) is satisfied for any  ≥ 0 if e    23, where e ≡ ¡19 +√217¢ 9.
If  ≥  ≥ e, where  ≡ ³12 + 2√73 +p346 + 30√73´ 9 defines  such that
Π∗ = 0. Then,  ≤ 0 for  = 0 and, by continuity, for sufficiently small  (since
  0 when   23). Part iv):   0 when   23.
From eqn. (8) we have seen that the degree to which the vertically integrated firm
chooses to foreclose its rival depends (in part) on the level of the access charge. The
higher is the access charge, the lower is the level of foreclosure. If the regulator finds
it socially optimal to restrict the activites of independent firms, it is preferable to use
the access charge to achieve this. Since there are social costs associated with non-
price foreclosure, the optimal access charge should take into account the opportunity
to foreclose rivals. Intuitively, this implies setting the access charge higher than is
the case when foreclosure is not an option.22 A high access charge mitigates the
21To focus on the core issue of foreclosure, the downstream marginal costs are normalised to
zero, but the effect of changes in the downstream marginal costs will be examined briefly below.
22To eliminate the foreclosure incentives altogether, the regulator could imitate the unregulated
solution as determined by eqn. (9). This results in a (monopoly) deadweight loss in the downstream
market.
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incentive to foreclose the independent firm, but results in a deadweight loss in the
downstream market. Lowering the access charge to correct for the distortion in the
downstream market, results in an increased incentive to foreclose.
The second and third part of Proposition 2 relates to the cost of access subsidies.
The regulator ideally wishes to subsidise access to correct for the imperfection in
the downstream market, but the costs associated with such subsidies restricts the
desirability of such a policy. If these costs are neglible, access subsidies may be war-
ranted. By subsidising access the regulated firm is disadvantaged in the downstream
market and will use non-price foreclosure to counter this effect. The third part of
Proposition 2 also indicates that access may be subsidies even with the possibility
of non-price foreclosure when the cost of foreclosure is sufficiently high, since the
extent of such behaviour will be negligible.
Part four of Proposition 2 tells us that the socially optimal access charge should
somehow reflect the fact that the cost associated with foreclosure restricts the prof-
itability of such activities. When foreclosure is costly, the level of foreclosure is less
responsive to changes in the access charge (i.e., 	∗ is less negative when  is
large). If a regulator wants to mitigate the foreclosure problem, this implies that
the access charge must be higher than the case when foreclosure is cheap (i.e., when
 is lower).
The desirability for the regulator to distort the access charge to achieve efficiency
in production will in the foreclosure case depend not only on the shadow cost of
public funds, but also on the cost of foreclosure. For the access charge to distort
market shares in favour of the more efficient producer, the access charge must be
decreasing in the downstream subsidiary’s marginal cost and increasing in the rival’s
marginal cost:23
Proposition 3 Assume   54. When the vertically integrated firm can exercise
non-price discrimination, we observe the following:
23To limit the cases that needs to be considered and to focus on the role that the foreclosure costs
play, I will restrict my attention to the cases where   54. When  ≥ 54, a similar situation to
the no-foreclosure case arises. The regulator may then find it optimal to ensure a large operating
profit to the regulated firm that may be taxed away in the full information case.
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i. The optimal access charge distorts downstream market shares in favour of
the more efficient firm only when the costs of foreclosure is sufficiently high ( 
(46− 8)  (45− 36)).
ii. For low convexity of foreclosure costs (23    1), the access charge is no
longer used to ensure efficient production in the downstream market.
Proof. The comparative static results for the optimal access charge when fore-
closure is possible are given by:  








 ≷ 0. If 
 = 
 = , then    0. Let   23 and  ∈ [0 54). Proof
of part i): Define  ≡  () to be the convexity level that defines  
 = 0.
Then, 0  0 for all , with 

→∞
 = 2. A sufficient condition to ensure  

 
0 for all , is   2, whereas for   54,   1 is sufficient. Furthermore,
 

  0 if the following inequality is satisfied: (∗) (45− 46)+ (8− 36)  0.
Define  ≡  () as the convexity such that  
 = 0. Then, 0  0 for all
 6= 54. If   54, then (∗) is satisfied if   (46− 8)  (45− 36). If  ≥ 54,
then  

  0 for all .
We know from eqn. (8) that the incentive for foreclosure is negatively related
to the downstream cost 
 (and more so the less costly foreclosure is), and that
increasing the access charge reduces the incentives to foreclose rivals. When 

increases, it becomes more likely that the VIF will choose to outsource a larger part
of the downstream production to an independent firm. An increase in 
 will then
subsequently lower the level of foreclosure directly as determined by eqn. (8). In
addition, there is an indirect effect on the incentives to foreclose rival firms since
the access charge is increasing in 
 if   1. These effects will direct production
towards the (relatively) more efficient producer.24
The second part of Proposition 3 indicates that the regulator should not (nec-
essarily) use the access charge to distort the market share in favour of the more
efficient firm, contrary to the case where non-price discrimination is not possible
(cf. Lewis and Sappington, 1999). In some circumstances it may be socially optimal
24Note, however, that as  approaches 54 the convexity of the foreclosure cost function must
go towards infinity to ensure that  is increasing in 
.
15
to use the access charge to level the playing field, by using the access charge to
offset differences in the downstream marginal costs. This is, in particular, the case
if the foreclosure related costs are not too convex. First, if the cost of downstream
production increases, total output falls which creates a welfare loss. Second, if the
cost of foreclosure is low, the VIF will choose a high level of foreclosure if there is
an increase in, e.g., 
. This results in a lower total output. When foreclosure is
sufficiently cheap, the latter contractive effect on total output is more severe than
the former (direct) effect. Increasing the access charge would imply a levelling of
the playing field. It would also reduce the incentive for non-price foreclosure. Since
foreclosure is cheap, the access charge need not be increased substantially to reduce
the foreclosure incentives and the output reduction due to an increase in the access
charge would be negligible.
3.3 Asymmetric Information
The regulator realises that if the network owner is present downstream, truthful
revelation must be based on the joint profit function for the vertically integrated firm,
i.e., equation (3). The reason is that the report of efficiency made to the regulator
internalises any effects that the report (and resulting infrastructure quality) has on
the downstream profits:




= −∗ + [( − 




From lemma 2 we observe that the regulated firm may face countervailing in-
centives,26 which come from the process of internalising the effects on downstream
profit. Since ∗
 ≥ 0, a necessary but not sufficient condition for countervail-
ing incentives to be present is   
.27 In the present analysis, we assume that






, and  are chosen optimally (in stages














26See Lewis and Sappington (1989).
27When there are (potentially) countervailing incentives, the standard procedure of assuming
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the countervailing effect on incentives never dominate. The sign of the incentive
constraint does not change over the relevant interval for 
, provided that   23
(assumed throughout the paper) and [( − 
) + ∗]  0.28
The first component of the incentive constraint, −∗, is also found in, e.g., the
Baron and Myerson (1982) model of regulation of a monopolist with unknown costs.
Reducing the quantity produced for less efficient types makes it less desirable for
efficient types to imitate less efficient types. In the present model, there is in addition
an effect on the downstream equilibrium of changing 
. By the envelope theorem,
the change of firm ’s downstream quantity from changing 
 does not affect the
incentive constraint. The effect of a change in 
 on the competitior’s equilibrium
quantity affects the price of the final product, and consequently, the incentives for
truthful reporting. This must be taken into account when formulating the incentive
constraint.
If the sign of the incentive constraint is unambiguously negative for all values of

 in the support, the firm has only incentives to overstate its upstream costs. The
positive element implies that the firmmay have incentives to understate its upstream
costs for some realisations of the efficiency parameter. The countervailing incentive
stems from the fact that a lower level of efficiency (i.e., a higher 
) effectively
increases the equilibrium quantity of firm . This has some opposing effects: 1) All
other things equal, increasing 
 implies that the profitability of selling access is
reduced. The information rent must increase to retain incentive compatibility. 2)
For a given quantity for firm , the price on inframarginal units falls due to the
increase in firm ’s output. To retain incentive compatibility, the information rent
must increase. 3) Increased output by firm  has a positive impact on profits, as this
increases the revenue the VIF earns on its upstream operations as the rival requires
more access capacity.29 This effect tends towards a lower level of information rents.
that (PC) binds for the least efficient type is no longer valid in the general case, and the partici-
pation constraint should be introduced explicitly into the optimisation problem.
28If ( − )+	
∗  0, we know from lemma 1 that ∗ = 0, and there will be no foreclosure.
Then, a necessary condition for ensuring that Π  0 ∀ ∈ £ ¤ is    + .
29Note that the negative effect on upstream profits from the negative impact that increasing 
has on 
∗ disappears by use of the envelope theorem. The only effect to consider is the one related
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3.3.1 Socially optimal access charges
The regulator maximises the expected value of the welfare function, with expecta-
tions taken over the upstream type of the regulated firm, 
, subject to participation
and incentive constraints.30 The regulator offers the incentive compatible contract





´´, to the upstream firm
to induce truthful revelation, using his knowledge of the distribution and support of
the unknown parameter, and of the way the game is played in the subsequent stages
(see appendix 3 - [RP 2]).
The optimal access charge under asymmetric information, defined as  if fore-
closure is possible and 	 if not, is shown to be equal to the optimal access charge
under full information plus an incentive correction term (see appendix 3 for details).
The magnitude and sign of the incentive correction term will depend on whether
the regulated firm can or cannot foreclose its rival. The qualitative insight of the
presence of asymmetry of information is, however, unaffected by whether foreclosure
is possible. In both cases, there is ”no distortion at the top” where the incentive
correction term is zero only when 
 = 
.31
Proposition 4 The socially optimal access charge under asymmetric information
is:
i) Distorted further away from marginal cost than in the full information case;
i.e.,  − 
   − 
.
ii) Higher when foreclosure is possible; i.e.,   

	.
Proof: See appendix 3.
to the change in the rival’s quantity.
30The participation constraint requires that the regulated firm earns non-negative aggregate
profits, Π ≥ 0, which implies that we need not be concerned with conditions to ensure the
profitability of the downstream subsidiary. However, when the participation constraint is applied
to aggregate profits this opens up the possibility for cross-subsidisation from the regulated activity
(upstream production) to the competitive segment (the downstream industry).
31A sufficient condition for the second-order incentive constraint to be satisfied is if the inverse
hasard rate is increasing in ; i.e., 

()
() ≥ 0. This assumption is satisfied for a number of
distributions.
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By setting a high access charge the regulator effectively restricts total output
downstream since ∗  0, which is detrimental to welfare. However, this
reduces the (socially costly) information rent necessary to induce truthful revela-
tion, since we know from lemma 2 that an access charge in excess of marginal cost
introduces an element of countervailing incentives. We observe that ( − 
) ¡
 − 
¢ for a given 
. When the regulator is imperfectly informed about the reg-
ulated firm’s cost structure, it is socially optimal to distort the access charge further
away from marginal cost of providing access to introduce countervailing incentives.
Creating such countervailing incentives can be beneficial from a social welfare point
of view as this reduces the information rents.
If the regulated firm can discriminate against rival firms, both the sign and
magnitude depends on both the convexity of the cost function and the efficiency
of the regulated firm. By increasing the access charge, total downstream output
is reduced which induces an efficiency loss. On the other hand, the countervailing
incentives becomes more pronounced and truthful revelation is less costly. The main
question is then whether the socially optimal access charge is set to favour the more
efficient downstream producer. It can be shown that the optimal access charge is
decreasing in the marginal cost of the downstream subsidiary (i.e., 

  0)
when   43.32 The optimal access charge is decreasing in 
 whenever   1, and
may be increasing in 
 if   1 provided that  is not too large.33
3.4 Welfare comparisons
The welfare comparisons between the various regulated cases are quite straightfor-
ward. The level of welfare is highest under full information and no foreclosure, and
is lowest when there is asymmetric information and foreclosure. The presence of
non-price discrimination implies an additional restriction on the welfare maximisa-
tion problem. The level of welfare is therefore always higher whenever non-price
discrimination is not possible. The asymmetry of information imposes yet another
32For lower , 
  0 if the shadow cost of public funds is low enough.
33This is essentially the same as is the case for optimal access charge under full information with
foreclosure,  , as reported in Proposition 3.
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constraint on the regulator’s problem, which necessarily will have a negative impact
on welfare.
If the regulator has full information about upstream costs and the access charge
is regulated, welfare is always higher when foreclosure is not possible since the access
charge is then a more presice regulatory instrument. When foreclosure is possible,
the access charge becomes less precise since it serves an additional purpose (i.e.,
to mitigate the foreclosure incentives) and the level of welfare is reduced. When
there is no access charge regulation, the rival firm is foreclosed completely if both
firms’ downstream costs are identical. In this situation, the VIF acts as a monopo-
list both upstream and downstream with the resulting monopoly inefficiency. The
regulator could replicate the monopoly outcome if this is socially optimal by imple-
menting the same access charge as the VIF would in the unregulated environment.
However, it turns out that when both downstream costs are identical, it is socially
optimal to choose less foreclosure than what is observed in the unregulated case.
The unregulated outcome is strictly worse in terms of welfare than the regulated
outcome.
Contrary to the full information case, welfare may be higher in the unregulated
case when the regulator is not perfectly informed about the upstream costs. If non-
price discrimination is possible, and assuming that 
 = 
, welfare is higher without
access charge regulation (the unregulated case). When non-price discrimination is
not an option, the result is more ambiguous. In the latter case, the magnitude of
marginal cost of providing access (
) to the market size (given by the parameter
) plays an important role in these welfare comparisons. If the marginal cost of
upstream production becomes sufficiently high relative to the size of the market,
welfare is highest in the unregulated case. The reason for this is a combination of
factors. First of all, the regulator need not award information rents to the vertically
integrated firm in the unregulated case. Second, in the unregulated case where the
rival is completely foreclosed, the problem of double marginalisation vanishes which
has a positive impact on welfare. Finally, as upstream marginal cost increases the
total downstream quantity falls faster in the regulated case than in the unregulated
case.
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The access margin −
 is increasing in upstreammarginal cost if there is asym-
metric information, but not in the case with full information. Since total downstream
quantity falls when 
 increases, the distortion in the downstream market becomes
larger as 
 increases. To mitigate this distortion, the regulator increases the access
charge by less than the increase in 
, which leads the access margin to fall under
full information. However, in the presence of asymmetric information, the magni-
tude of the access margin is important determinant for the level of the information
rent, with the information rent being lower the higher is the access margin. The
regulator may then choose to accept a larger distortion in the downstream market
when 
 increases in order to reduce the costly information rents payable to the
regulated firm.
4 Concluding remarks
In a number of countries, including the US and EU, regulatory authorities overseeing
the communications industry recommend using a cost based policy with respect to
the pricing of access to essential facilities. In both the US 1996 Telecommunications
Act and the new regulatory package in the EU, access charges are recommended to
be non-discriminatory and cost based and may include a reasonable profit to cover
non-traffic sensitive costs. An important reason for pursuing such a policy is that
this ensures rival firms access to the essential facility at reasonable terms, with the
ultimate goal of increasing the degree of competition to the benefit of consumers.
If the vertically integrated firm is allowed to determine access charges without reg-
ulatory intervention, it will do so to foreclose rival firms, and, consequently, there
is some scope for the regulation of access charges. By focusing too heavily on the
costs of providing access in the determination of optimal access charges, the regula-
tors may run the risk of ignoring the possibility that the network owner may choose
to discriminate against potential rivals by means of non-price behaviour (such as
degrading the quality of access offered to rival firms, which then translates into a
lower quality of the rival’s final product). Naturally, regulators also put emphasis
on quality aspects of access provision, but it is inherently more difficult to regulate
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quality than price. This implies that even if quality is subject to regulation, it is
likely that this regulation is less than perfect and that there will be considerable
scope for quality discrimination.
The analysis above suggests that if regulators cannot write complete contracts
with respect to the access terms offered to rivals (i.e., the regulators can only control
the price a network owner charges, but not the quality of the access), the optimal
access charge should be distorted away from marginal costs of providing access to
yield a positive profit margin on access. Even if we assume that the regulator can
control all aspects of the access terms offered to rival firms (or, alternatively, can
use a more comprehensive set of regulatory instruments), the optimal access charge
will in general be different from the marginal cost of providing access in situations
where there is imperfect competition downstream (and may yield either an access
profit or deficit, depending on how socially costly transfers to the regulated firm
are).
Previous analysis on access regulation have pointed out that access charges
should be set so that production is undertaken as efficient as possible, which in-
volves examining the relative efficiencies of the service providers. The results in the
present paper supports such a policy, but it also suggests that the regulation of the
access charge should not always be used to award the more efficient downstream
firm a larger market share.
Some of the results obtained in the paper may be useful in a policy context,
and in particular how vertically integrated firms’ opportunities for non-price dis-
crimination should influence the determination of access charges. To focus on the
main issue the present analysis is undertaken in a stylised model, which assumes
specific functional forms and a particular informational asymmetry. A more general
model, both with respect to the informational structure and the demand and cost
specifications, would be useful to be able to more forcefully challenge the cost-based
access charge regulation.
Finally, the analysis assumes that the regulator does not utilise all available in-
formation when designing the regulation mechanism. In particular, examination of
practical regulation of the communications industry has led me to exclude the possi-
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bility for regulators to set up monetary penalties to avoid non-price discrimination.
In a more complete regulatory mechanism, such a penalty should be considered.
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Cournot competition Firm  chooses the level of quantity ∗ which maximisesΠ,
where Π is defined by eqn. (3). Firm  solves a similar maximisation problem, maximis-
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ing (2) with respect to . The VIF’s optimal quantity choice is determined by: ∗ +¡
 (∗)− 
 − 
¢ = 0. For firm , the optimal quantity is determined by: ∗ +¡
 (∗)− 






 +  + 	¢ 3 and ∗ = ¡− 2 ¡
 +  + 	¢+ 
 + 
¢ 3.





 −  − 	¢ 3.
Quality degradation The profit maximising level of quality degradation 	∗, is gov-




















the envelope theorem, which yields eqn. (7) and can, by using the linear demand func-
tion and quadratic cost function, be rewritten as eqn. (8). The profit maximising level
of foreclosure has the following properties: 	∗
 = −4 (9− 2)  0, 	∗
 =
2 (9− 2)  0, 	∗
 = 2 (9− 2)  0 and 	∗ = −4 (9− 2)  0.
Appendix 2
With full information and the absence of non-price discrimination, the socially optimal
access charge 	 is the solution to [RP 1], and can be written as:
	 =
 (5− 1)− 
 (4 + ) + 
 (5− 4) + 
 (2 + 5)
1 + 10
The second-order condition with respect to  is satisfied in this case since   0. The
comparative statics are as follows: 	 = (5− 1)  (1 + 10)  0 if   15,
	

 = − (4 + )  (1 + 10)  0, 	
 = (5− 4)  (1 + 10)  0 if
  54, and 	

 = (2 + 5)  (1 + 10)  0.
When non-price discrimination is an option for the vertically integrated firm, the
constrained optimal access charge,  , is the solution to the regulator’s maximisation













16 + 8− 362 +  ¡20− 92 − 4¢¢+ 






452 − 28+ 4¢+ 182 + 14− 12¢¤
where  ≡ (92 + 52− 28 + 2 (452 − 28+ 4)). A sufficient condition for
concavity of  with respect to  is   23.
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Appendix 3







) + (1 + )
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− (1 + ) − Π]  (
)
subject to 1) Π


= −∗ + [( − 
) + ∗] ∗ [IC], 2) Π (
) ≥ 0 [PC], 3)

 ≥ 0 [SIC], 4) 	∗ = argmax

Π (∗ ∗) [S.3], and 5)  = ∗ ≥ 0,  = ∗ ≥ 0
[S.4]. Constraint S.3 is the profit-maximising level of foreclosure, and S.4 is the Cournot-
equilibrium. The participation constraint, [PC], must be satisfied to induce voluntary par-
ticipation. Constraint SIC, is the second-order incentive constraint, which is checked ex




positive if   23, then 






´o (see, e.g., Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984). Maximising expression
(11) with respect to , subject to the constraints defines the optimal access charge under







= 0, where  refers to the welfare





(3− 2) (15− 2)  (9− 2)2¢ in the fore-
closure case, and 
2Π

= 59 in the no-foreclosure case. Consequently,    since
2Π

 0, and   

	 since is concave in the access charge and
2Π

  
2Π

 .
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